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ARMED INJUSTICE:
ABUSE OF THE LAW AND COMPLEX CRIME
IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA
THOMAS FIRESTONE

"For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separatedfrom
law andjustice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous,
and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and virtue,
which he may use for the worst ends. "'
"[A] club is a primitive weapon, a rifle is a more efficient one, the most
efficient is the court."
Nikolai Krylenko, Commissar ofJustice of the Soviet Union, 1936-1938
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I. INTRODUCTION

Abuse of the legal system has become a central technique in various
fraudulent and extortionate schemes in Russia. Examples include:
* "commissioned" criminal prosecutions brought for the purpose of extorting
money from the victim or driving him out of business;
* "intellectual property squatting" in which "squatters" exploit legal
loopholes to register rights to a trademark or patent then initiate
extortionate legal proceedings against alleged "infringers";
* "corporate raiding"3 in which criminals use corruptly obtained legal
documents, such as shareholders' resolutions, court judgments and
state registration documents, as justification to seize a victim
company's assets; and

Resident Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Embassy-Moscow. The views and opinions
expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of Justice or
the U.S. government. For reasons set forth below, very few of the cases discussed herein have resulted
in criminal convictions. Therefore, in discussing particular cases, this article relies heavily on publicly
available allegations by victims and law enforcement. Unless otherwise noted, nothing in this article
should be taken as a statement by the author or the U.S. government that the individuals or companies
mentioned as defendants or subjects of investigation are in fact guilty or that they should not be
presumed innocent. The author would like to thank the following for their helpful comments: Pavel
Boulatov, Richard Daddario, Eric Hamrin, Rosie Hawes, Kathryn Hendley, Daniel Klein, Lauren
McCarthy, Catherine Newcombe, Peter Prahar and Daniel Rosenthal.
1. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 29 (Benjamin Jowett & H.W.C Davis eds., Cosimo Inc. 2008)(1905).
2. HAROLD J. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 36 (1963) (quoting N.V. Krylenko in 1923).
3. See generally, Thomas Firestone, Criminal CorporateRaiding in Russia,42 INT'L LAW. 1207
(2008) (discussing corporate raiding in Russia as "a new and sophisticated form of organized crime").
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* collusive litigation in which private parties create a pretextual lawsuit to
obtain a predetermined judicial ruling which is then used as part of a
scheme to misappropriate the victim's assets.4
American businesses, such as Hermitage Capital and Starbucks have
reportedly been victimized by the practices described in this article and, according
to a U.S. federal judge, "esteemed" U.S. law firms have been used as an instrument
in at least one such scheme in the United States. From a purely criminal
standpoint, such schemes are brilliant. Using the law as both sword and shield,
the perpetrator turns the victim into a legal defendant, misappropriates the state's
legal enforcement power for private ends, and obtains a cover from liability
through the claim that he is merely enforcing a legal right.
Despite a wealth of quality literature on the various manifestations of
organized crime in contemporary Russia, analysts have failed to isolate and study
this dangerous trend. 6 This article attempts to fill that gap by: (1) identifying and
explaining some of the most common schemes relying on manipulation of the legal
system; (2) tracing the historical origins of this phenomenon; (3) analyzing the
steps the government is taking to combat the problem; and (4) identifying possible
implications of this study for those concerned with the rule of law in Russia.
II. SCHEMES RELYING ON ABUSE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM

A. Commissioned Prosecutions
Commissioned criminal prosecutions ("zakaznye dyela"), a term referring to
(a) criminal cases "commissioned" by third parties as a way of sabotaging business
competitors and (b) criminal cases initiated by law enforcement for extortionate or

other improper purposes, are probably the most clear-cut examples of criminal
legal abuse in Russia. As Genri Reznick, the head of the Moscow City Bar

4. These schemes are not mutually exclusive and sometimes supplement one another as part of
the same scheme. For example, commissioned prosecutions and collusive litigation are often used in
support of corporate raids. They are separated here only for purposes of analytical clarity.
5. See Telenor Mobile Commc'ns AS v. Storm LLC, 587 F. Supp. 2d 594, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(expressing "outrage[ ]" and "surpris[e]" that "two esteemed New York law firms" had become
instruments of Storm and the Altimo's scheme to use a "sham" Ukrainian judicial ruling in a U.S.
court).
6. For English language literature, see, e.g., JOSEPH SERIO, INVESTIGATING THE RUSSIAN MAFIA
(2008); MIsHA GLENNY, MCMAFIA: SERIOUSLY ORGANIZED CRIME 30-31, 312-13 (2008) (discussing
Russian cybercrime and money laundering); STEPHEN HANDELMAN, COMRADE CRIMINAL: RUSSIA'S
NEW MAFIYA (1995); VADIM VOLKOV, VIOLENT ENTREPRENEURS: THE USE OF FORCE IN THE MAKING
OF RUSSIAN CAPITALISM (2002); PAUL KLEBNIKOV, GODFATHER OF THE KREMLIN: BORIS
BEREZOVSKY AND THE LOOTING OF RUSSIA (2000); ROBERT I. FRIEDMAN, RED MAFIYA: HOW THE
RUSSIAN MOB HAS INVADED AMERICA (2000); RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME: THE NEW THREAT? (Phil
Williams ed., 2d ed. 2000); JAMES 0. FINCKENAUER & ELIN J. WARING, RUSSIAN MAFIA IN AMERICA:

IMMIGRATION, CULTURE, AND CRIME (1998);

Louise Shelley, Crime, Organized Crime and

Corruption, in AFTER PUTIN's RUSSIA: PAST IMPERFECT, FUTURE UNCERTAIN 183-98 (Stephen K.
Wegren & Dale R. Herspring eds., 4th ed. 2009).
7. According to some, only cases initiated by third parties should be referred to as
"commissioned cases," given the role of a third party in "commissioning" the case. However, given the
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Association, recently said, "commissioned prosecutions" are the "most repulsive
phenomenon in our justice system." 8
The problem of commissioned cases is widespread and openly recognized at
the highest levels of government. In 2008, President Medvedev called on law
enforcement to stop "terrorizing" business through "attacks" motivated by
commercial aims. 9 Prime Minister Putin recently stated that the majority of
regulatory inspections of businesses (often the first stage of a criminal case) were
likely "commissioned." 0
And in 2006, Prosecutor General Yuriy Chayka
identified commissioned prosecutions as a major problem for Russia,
acknowledged at least 20 such cases in Russia's Central Federal District alone, and
promised a review of all criminal cases to determine if they had been
commissioned." Of course, the United States has seen its share of abuse of the
criminal justice system for extortionate ends. But in the United States, such cases
typically involve extortion of criminals who are, by definition, vulnerable to the
threat of criminal prosecution. 12 In Russia, however, extortionate prosecutions
have expanded to target legitimate businesses, a feat accomplished by the creative
use of legal loopholes and ambiguities to create a threat of criminal prosecution
which would not otherwise exist.
One example of the creative abuse of legal ambiguity is provided by the socalled "Chemists Case," in which corrupt agents of the State Drug Control Agency
(FSKN) tried to extort money from the owners of a chemical business. As part of
the scheme, the agents brought criminal charges against them for the distribution
of diethyl ether, a chemical solvent commonly used as an anesthetic.13 The agents
perception of a tight connection between corruptly motivated private parties and corrupt law
enforcement and the widespread belief that some cases are "commissioned" by higher-ups within the
government or law enforcement for improper motives, the term is used to refer generally to criminal
cases brought for improper commercial or political motives. See P.A. SKOBLIKOV, KORRUPTSIYA V
SOVREMENNOI RossII 33-34 (2009). Given the frequent overlap of corrupt commercial motives
between these two types of cases, the similarity in techniques that such prosecutions employ and
common legal issues that such cases raise, this article uses the term "commissioned cases" to refer to
both and treats them as one phenomenon.
8. Interview with Genri Reznick, Sept. 18, 2009, available at http://www.rusnovosti.ru/pro
gramms/prog/39964/ 51027/.
9. Medvedev PoprosilPerestat' "Koshmarit" Biznes, [Medvedev Asked to Stop "a Nightmare"
Business] LENTA.RU, July 31, 2008, http://www.lenta.ru/news/2008/07/31/koshmarit/.
10. Nigina Beroeva, Vladimir Putin: "Bol'shinstvo proverok biznesa - "zakazniye" ili
nedobrosovestniye" ["The Majority of Russian Business inspections -- are "commissioned" or
unscrupulous"], KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA [THE TRUTH OF THE KOMSOMOL], Nov. 25, 2009,
available at http://pskov.kp.ru/print/article/24400/576309/.
11. Yuri Chaika prekratit "zakaznye dela," [Yuri Chaika Stop "Custom Action"], LENTA.RU,
Aug. 15, 2006, http://lenta.ru/news/2006/08/15/chaika/. It is not clear what became of this promised
review and Russian sources are devoid of any indication that it was ever conducted or its results
announced.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 363 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2004) (extortion of drug dealers
by corrupt police officers); United States v. DePeri, 778 F.2d 963, 968 (3d Cir. 1985) (extortion of
illegal gambling operations by corrupt police officers).
13. See Gregory L. White, Once Jailed Russian Executive Pushes Law Changes, WALL ST. J.,
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relied on Article 234 of the Russian Criminal Code, which criminalizes the
commercial distribution of so-called "virulent" substances, a term nowhere defined
in the criminal law. 14 The absence of a statutory definition allowed the officers to
rely on a list of allegedly "virulent" substances that had been prepared by an
outside expert who had no official status or legislative or administrative
authority.15 After a disavowal of the list by the Ministry of Health and a public
campaign highlighting the absurdity of the prosecution, the case was eventually
dropped. 16 However, the subjects each spent at least seven months in jail.17
Similar cases, relying on contradictions and ambiguities in Russian law
related to the anesthetic ketamine (which was prohibited by one official act, but
authorized for veterinary anesthetic purposes by another) were brought in 2003
against veterinarians for administering ketamine to pets during routine
operations." In these cases, drug control agents set up sting operations in which
they brought animals in for treatment. As soon as the veterinarian administered
ketamine, they arrested him. 19 Approximately 20 such cases were initiated during
2003.20 Eventually, the Ministry of Agriculture officially approved the use of
ketamine for veterinary uses and almost all of the criminal cases were closed.21
Another common technique of subjecting businesses to enhanced penalties for
the purpose of facilitating extortion involves the use of Article 171 of the Criminal
Code, "Illegal Enterprise" ("operating an illegal enterprise without registration or a
special permit (license), in cases where such permit (license) is obligatory"), in
conjunction with Article 174.1(1), which criminalizes the use of illegally generated
proceeds for "pursuance of entrepreneurial or another economic activity."22
Because Article 174, in contrast to U.S. money laundering laws, is not based on a
Dec. 30, 2009, at A7, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126212533991109359.html; see
Thomas J. Evans, The Unusual History of Ether (2008), http://www.anesthesia-nursing.conVether.html.
See also Materiali Dyela Khimikov NPK Sofeks, [The Case Materials Chemists],
http://www.himdelo.ru/material/podrobnee/008/ [hereinafter Khimikov] (describing the events of the
arrest and subsequent proceedings).
14. Ugoloynyi Kodeks RF [UK] [Criminal Code] art.234 (Russ.).
15. See Khimikov, supranote 13.
16. Id.; Interview with Yanna Yakovleva, one of the defendants in the case, in Moscow, Russia
(Feb. 2010) [hereinafter Yakovieva Interview] (on file with author).
17. Yakovieva Interview, supra note 16.
18. Sid Yanyshev, Dyelo Veterinarov-Vreditelyei [Case Veterinary Pests], GAZETA.RU, Dec. 26,
2003, http://www.gazeta.ru/2003/12/25/vovsemvinove.shtml.
19. Elya Vermisheva, Prokuratura Moskvi priznala zakonnim izpol'zovaniye ketamina v
veterinarnoipraktike [Prosecutors in Moscow have Recognized the Legitimate Use of Ketamine in
Veterinary Practice],GAZETA.RU, June 19, 2004, http://www.medlinks.ru/article.php?sid=16360.
20. Id.
21. Id; Prikaz Ministerstvo sel'skogo khozyaistva Rossisskoi Federatsiiot 29 Dekabrya 2003 g.
N 1580/619 g Moskva ob utverzhdenii perechnya narkoticheskikh sredstv i psikhotropnikh veshestv
ispol'zuyemykh v veterenarii [Order of the Ministry ofAgriculture of the Russian Federation,Ministry
of Health of the Russian Federationof December 29, 2003 Moscow N 1580/619 Approving the List of
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Used in Veterinary Medicine], Feb. 3, 2004, available at
http://www.rg.ru/2004/02/03/veterinary-doc.html.
22. Ugolovnyi Kodeks RF [UK] [Criminal Code] arts.171, 174 (Russ.).
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list of specified unlawful activities, any crime (with the exception of certain tax
offenses) can be used as a money laundering predicate. Thus, taken together, these
two statutes allow corrupt law enforcement officers to use a paperwork violation in
a company's registration documents to charge the business owners with illegal
entrepreneurship, declare all of the business's proceeds illegal, and then threaten
the owners and employees with aggravated money laundering (an offense which
carries up to 15 years incarceration and a fine equal to the defendant's total
earnings).23
For example, such a scheme was allegedly used in the so-called "Pharmacists'
Case." In that case, the lead defendant, Fyodor Dushin, co-owned a pharmacy in
the city of Podolsk with a business partner, Vagif Kuliyev. Kuliyev sought to buy
him out, but Dushin refused. According to Dushin, Kuliyev then initiated a
criminal case against him and helped law enforcement officers plant false
evidence, ostensibly showing that the pharmacy was distributing prescription
medicines without an appropriate license. This formed the basis for an Article 171
illegal entrepreneurship charge which, in turn, provided a basis for charges of
money laundering by an organized group under Article 174.1. Eventually, Dushin
was sentenced to seven years incarceration and 10 of his employees were each
sentenced to two years incarceration.24
According to Viktor Denisenko, a businessman in Taganrog recently
subjected to similar charges, there are currently five prosecutions relying on the
same combination of Articles 171 and 174 just in the city of Taganrog (population
of approximately 260,000).25
The abuse of these statutes has become so
widespread that lawmakers recently announced a plan to redraft parts of the
Criminal Code in order to make such schemes impossible by, for example,
excluding proceeds from "illegal entrepreneurship" from the scope of Article
174.26

23. See, e.g., Dyelo farmatsevtov: obshchestvennaya otsenka prigovora [Lawsuit of the
pharmacists: the public evaluation of the sentence], DYELO FARMATSEVTOV, Apr. 6, 2009,
http://www.himdelo.ru/hrono/podrobnee/139/; Aleksander Tveretin, Obrasheniye k deputatam
Gosudarstvennoi Dumi RF [Turning to Deputies of the State Duma RF] (July 29, 2008), transcript
available at http://www.himdelo.ru/prima/podrobnee/168/; Ugolovnyi Kodeks RF [UK] [Criminal
Code] arts. 174.1 (Russ.).
24. See Tveretin, supra note 23. Kuliyev, who allegedly had responsibility for establishing and
implementing the pharmacy's policies on distribution of medicines and also for all financial
disbursements in the pharmacy, escaped prosecution altogether, a fact which seems to corroborate
Dushin's claims that the case was orchestrated by him.
25. Denisenko was charged under Articles 171 and 174 on the grounds that his industrial machine
parts laboratory allegedly lacked a necessary "supplemental license." Viktor Denisenko, Kak menya
naznachali prestupnikom [As they Appointed me the Criminal] transcript available at
http://www.kapitalisty.ru/prime/podrobnee/016/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2010); The Official Website of the
City of Taganrog, http://www.taganrogcity.com/guide.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
26. See, e.g., Chast' Gosdumi Priznayet NeobkhoDimost'popravok v Stat'yu ob Otmyvanii Deneg
[A Part of Gosduma Recognizes the Necessity of Amending the Statute Which Concerns Money
Laundering], FINAM FM, Nov. 10, 2010, http://finam.fm/news/39388/printl [hereinafter - Money
Laundering]. Partly in response to this initiative, in April 2010, the Duma amended Article 174.1 of the
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B. IntellectualPropertySquatting
"Intellectual property squatting"-the practice of registering trademarks and
patents on brands and products already in use and then threatening civil or criminal
litigation against the existing rights holders if they do not pay-is another prime
example of legal abuse in Russia. According to one analysis, the business of
misappropriating others' brands has reached "colossal proportions."27 Russia has
even spawned a class of professional IP "marauders"-lawyers who specialize in
identifying trademarks and patents vulnerable to attack, registering them, and then
initiating litigation against the true rights holders in order to force a buyback.28
Allegedly, they earn hundreds of millions of dollars annually.29 One famous
trademark squatter, Sergey Zuykov, stated publicly that each successful case of
squatting brings him approximately $10-15,000.3O
Russia's IP squatters rely on a variety of legal techniques. For example,
under Article 1486(1) of Part IV of the Civil Code, which regulates intellectual
property rights, a trademark can be invalidated if not used for more than three
years and anyone has the right to file an application to cancel a trademark on the
grounds of non-use.31 Zuykov relied on this provision to cancel and then reregister the Russian trademark of the American coffeehouse Starbucks (which had
registered in Russia in 1997, but then delayed its entry into the market because of
the financial crisis of 1998) in the name of a company he controlled.3 2 Zuykov
demanded a $600,000 payout from Starbucks to sell the trademark.33 Although the
company refused to pay and eventually won the case in court, Zuykov was able to
delay Starbucks' entry into the Russian market by three years,34 a fact which
makes the threat of trademark extortion potent for other potential victims.
Similarly, in patent squatting schemes, a "patent racketeer" takes one
distinctive aspect of an established product, describes that aspect in an original
way, obtains a patent on that part, and then initiates litigation against the maker of
the complete product.35 One example might be obtaining a patent on a machine
Criminal Code to exclude from its scope the use of criminal proceeds for the realization of
entrepreneurial activity. See Ugolovnyi Kodeks RF [UK] 174.1.
27. Mastera na Vsye Znaki [Masters of all Trademarks], RUWEB, http://www.ruweb.com/index.php?vprn-yes&id=39 (last visited Apr. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Masters of all
Trademarks].
28. See, e.g., Dmitrii Denisov, Intellektual'noye maroderstvo bez vzloma [Intellectual Looting
without the Breaking], BIZNES-ZHURNAL, Jan. 25, 2006, http://www.linnik-patent.conarticle0O30.
html.
29. Masters of all Trademarks, supranote 27.
30. Patentnyi reket v Rossii: Vorovstvo tovarnykh znakov i brendov [Trademarks:Racketeering of
Patentsin Russia], http://www.advertme.ru/znaki/9 (last visited April 8, 2010).
31. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] Part IV, art. 1486(1) (Russ.).
32. See Denisov, supra note 28; Andrew Kramer, After Long Dispute, A Russian Starbucks, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at C3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/07/business/worldbusiness
/07sbux.html.
33. See Denisov, supranote 28; Kramer, supra note 32.
34. Kramer, supra note 32.
35. Dmitrii Denisov, Ostorozhno Zliye Patenti![Careful, Evil Patents!], BIZNES-ZHURNAL, Sept.
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that produces cavitation bubbles of a certain size at a certain depth in water at a
certain temperature and then suing manufacturers of Jacuzzis for infringement.36
In one famous case, a company called Technopolis took one aspect of the design of
bottles used by several beer makers - a rounded cone-like shape at the top described it in a novel, complicated and almost incomprehensible way (referring,
in part, to vessels with fragments of a slanted conical diameter with an inside and
outside) obtained a patent on this "design" and then demanded 5% of the beer
companies' proceeds.37 Eventually, the beer companies were able to get the
Technopolis patents annulled.38
Patent racketeers typically rely on a "utility model patent," a simplified form
of patent, not available in the United States, which does not require an extensive
world-wide search for analogous products or a thorough examination of the
product's originality.3 9 According to the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), utility model patents are primarily designed for small and medium sized
businesses that make minor improvements to and/or adaptations of existing
products. 40 Therefore, the applicant often does not need to prove an "inventive
step" or "non-obviousness" of the invention, as is the case with ordinary patent
applications, and patent offices do not make a substantive examination of the
application of the patent before approving it.41 For example, under Russian law, an
invention can be patented if it is: (1) new; (2) has "inventive level" (i.e. inventive
step); and (3) has industrial application. 42 For utility models, however, the
requirements are relaxed and the applicant need not demonstrate "inventive
level." 43

30, 2008, http://www.business-magazine.ru/trends/competition/pub307157.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Tatyana Samoilova, Kak ya izobrel butylku, gvozd' i skvorechnik, [How I invented the bottle,
the nail, and the birdhouse], 12R INTERNET LIBRARY, http://i2r.ru/static/494/out 9815.shtml (last
visited Apr. 6, 2010).
39. See Vladislav Sorokin, Taina Patentnykh Trollei [The Secret of Patent Trolls] (NTV
Television broadcast July 6, 2009 at 19:19) availableat http://ip.ntv.ru/news/2745/.
40. See World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Protecting Innovations by Utility
Models, http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ipbusiness/utilitymodels/utilitymodels.htm (last visited Apr. 6,
2010).
41. Id. According to WIPO, only a small but significant number of countries make utility model
patents available. These include: Albania, Angola, Argentina, ARIPO, Armenia, Aruba, Australia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belize, Brazil, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Chile, China (including Hong Kong and
Macau), Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, OAPI, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Taiwan, Tajikistan,
Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay and Uzbekistan. See WIPO, Where can Utility Models
be Acquired?, http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip business/utilitymodels/where.htm (last visited Apr. 6,
2010).
42. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] Part IV, art. 1350(1) (Russ.).
43. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] Part IV, art.1351(1) (Russ.).
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Whatever their merits may be, the relative ease of obtaining utility model
patents makes them ideally suited to abuse. As one Russian lawyer said, a utility
model patent can be obtained on almost any product, so long as it is described in
an original way. For example, one could theoretically obtain a utility model patent
for a standard eyeglass case by describing the plastic trim at the intersection of the
two sides as a distinguishing characteristic guaranteeing the hermetic seal of the
case. 44 Other lawyers claim that not even this much is required, and that a utility
patent model can be obtained on almost any product which is not already patented
within six months, as no substantive review is required.45 Although utility model
patents generally enjoy lesser protection than ordinary patents (in Russia, they are
protected for 10 years, while ordinary patents are protected for 20 years46), this is
still more than enough time for the patent racketeer to shake down his prey
(especially given that annulling a utility model patent can often take up to three
years47). And under Russian law, when a patent holder, no matter how nominal or
dubious his claim to the patent may be, brings an infringement suit, the burden is
on the defendant to prove non-infringement, rather than on the plaintiff to prove
the validity of the underlying patent, a rule which facilitates extortionate
litigation.48
Patent extortion is also facilitated by the fact that Russian law, in contrast to
U.S. law, provides for criminal liability for patent infringement. 49 This allows
patent racketeers to enhance their threats by initiating criminal prosecutions against
"infringers." According to Daniel Klein, a U.S. patent attorney practicing in
Moscow and a partner in the law firm of Hellevig, Klein & Usov, the cost to a
patent racketeer of initiating a criminal proceeding against his victim is relatively
low. However, once the criminal case begins, the victim may face serious business
disruptions because law enforcement authorities can seize property, temporarily
close importation and manufacturing operations, and arrest the business's
managers. Such attacks disrupt the company's physical operations and drive away
customers, who may fear criminal prosecution for purchasing potentially infringing
products and/or be prohibited from doing business with suppliers under criminal
investigation. In short, the combination of operational disruption and reputational
damage resulting from a racketeer's attack can destroy a legitimate business.o
Moreover, annulling a utility model patent that was obtained in bad faith can
often take three years, thus creating the likelihood that the victim "infringer" will
be prosecuted and serve his sentence before he succeeds in demonstrating the
44. Denisov, supranote 35.
45. Interview with Daniel Klein, Partner-In-Charge, Hellevig, Klein & Usov, in Moscow, Russ.
(Dec. 17, 2009) (on file with author); Interview with Denis Uzoykin, in Moscow, Russ. (Dec. 17, 2009)
(on file with author).
46. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 1363(1) (Russ.).
47. See Klein, supranote 45; Uzoykin, supranote 44.
48. See Sorokin, supra, note 39.
49. Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] art.147 (Russ.).
50. E-mails from Daniel Klein, Partner-In-Charge, Hellevig, Klein & Usov, to author, (Feb.
2010) (on file with author).
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invalidity of the faux patent, which gave rise to his criminal prosecution.5 1 Finally,
Russian law does not clearly criminalize squatting, 52 thus allowing squatters to
claim, as Zuykov once stated, "it's not fair, but it's legal." 53
C. CorporateRaiding ("Reiderstvo")
Corporate raiding ("reiderstvo"), a phenomenon which President Medvedev
has called "shameful" and which the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) estimates
generates approximately 120 billion rubles (approximately $40 million) a year in
illegal profits, is "legal racketeering" at its worst. 4 Raiding lacks an official legal
definition in Russia and the word is used carelessly to describe a number of
unethical business practices. For purposes of this article, corporate raiding will be
defined as the seizure, or attempted seizure, of a business or a substantial part of its
assets, through the corrupt reliance on a legal document, including, but not limited
to, a court order, judicial decision, corporate resolution, corporate charter
document, or state registration document. The execution of a corporate raid
typically involves the following three stages: (1) the raider creates or corruptly
obtains a legal document establishing faux legal title to some assets, usually shares
or real property of a business; (2) the raider carries out a forcible takeover of the
target property; and (3) the raider launders the seized property through a series of
shell companies to an ostensible "good faith purchaser" from whom it is essentially
impossible to recover the property. Typically, the shell companies disappear as
soon as they have fulfilled their purpose and the victim is left with no one to
pursue. Each stage relies on abuse of the legal system.

51. There is some indication that intellectual property racketeering has now moved into
cyberspace. According to one report, Burger King recently filed suit against squatters who registered
the internet domain name burgerking.ru. See Christina Busko, Forgeryof a Hamburger,KOMMERSANT,
Dec. 23, 2009, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocslD=1297726.
52. For example, there is no article in the Criminal Code on intellectual property squatting.
Article 147 of the Criminal Code criminalizes, inter alia, the "illegal use of a ... utility model" but it is
not clear if this applies only to the misappropriation of a third party's utility model or to the (mis)use of
one's own utility model for extortionate purposes. Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] art. 147
(Russ.). Article 180 of the Criminal Code criminalizes the illegal use of "another's" trademark, thus
seemingly excluding the use of one's own trademark for extortionate purposes. Ugolovnyi Kodeks
[UK] [Criminal Code] art.180 (Russ.). Finally, Article 163, Extortion, applies by its terms to threats to
damage "another's property." Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] art.163 (Russ.). It is not clear
how this statute applies in a situation where the victim no longer holds legal title to the intellectual
property in question because such title has been acquired by the squatter. The author is unaware of any
criminal prosecutions of squatters under Article 163 and is unaware of any legal authority the
applicability of Articles 147, 163 or 180 to intellectual property squatting.
53. Andrew Kramer, Ex-salesman Stalls Starbucks' Russian Entry, INDIAN EXPRESS, Oct. 13,
2005, http://www.indianexpress.conVoldStory/79886/.
54. See, e.g., Rosbalt Informationnoe Agenstvo [Rosbalt Information Agency], Medvedev: Za
Reiderstvo Nuzhno Bit' po Rukam [Medvedev: Corporate Raiding Should be Punished],
http://www.rosbalt.ru/2008/02/27/460264.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2010); Philip Aldrick, Exposing
Russia's Corporate 'Corruption',Apr. 4, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/2787471/
Exposing-Russias-corporate-corruption.html;
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Stage 1 - Obtaining the Documents
In the most blatant schemes, the raider simply creates false legal documents
purporting to establish title to the property he intends to take. For example, in one
2005 case in Moscow, a real estate developer was convicted of creating false
documents purporting to establish ownership of 400 hectares of land, worth 6.5
million rubles." Sometimes, the raider blackmails or bribes an employee of the
target company for access to the documents, which are then falsified to install a
false board of directors. According to court documents from one recent case, a St.
Petersburg organized crime boss, Vladimir Barsukov, a/k/a "Kumarin," and several
of his associates were convicted of a raiding scheme in which they deposited false
documents with the State Registry of Corporate Entities, purporting to transfer
ownership of the target businesses to Kumarin's co-conspirators. This official
registration then generated other official documents which were used as the pretext
for the forcible takeover of the businesses. In some cases, officials at the State
Registry were simply deceived into believing that the deposited documents were
authentic. In other cases, they were bribed to accept documents that they knew to
be false.56
In more sophisticated schemes, the raider files a lawsuit against the target,
often in a remote location where the raider has influence over the local judiciary,
and then obtains a judicial order authorizing seizure of some or all of the target's
assets. 7 This tactic was allegedly used in the much publicized Ilim Pulp case,
which involved an attempted (but unsuccessful) raid of Ilim Pulp, Russia's largest
forest products company by an entity controlled by oligarch Oleg Deripaska. In
2002, a minority shareholder in one of llim's mills filed suit in a remote location in

Siberia, alleging that Ilim had failed to comply with all the terms of its 1994
privatization." A judge awarded the plaintiff $113 million in damages, confiscated
two-thirds of the mill's stock, and transferred the stock to the St. Petersburg State
Property Committee, which then sold the stock to Deripaska and his partner.5 9 Ilim
55. Denis Tykulov, ProkuraturaProveryaet Skupshchikov Podmoskovnykh Zemel' [Prosecution
Checking Buyers of Land in the Moscow Suburbs], GZT.RU NOVOSTI [GZT.RU NEWS],
http://gzt.ru/print.phpp=home/2005/12/19/211137.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
56. See Prigovor Imenem Rossiiskaia Federatsii [Conviction by the Russian Federation],
ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [Ros. Gaz.] Nov. 12, 2009 (Russ.) Case No. 1-41/09 [hereinafter Kumarin
Judgment] (on file with author), 8, 14. The Kumarin case is the largest raiding case which has been
successfully prosecuted in Russia and the court's very detailed judgment provides a rich source of
information on the mechanics of raiding schemes. Therefore, this article relies extensively on the
judgment. See also Vladimir Fedosenko, Srok i Avtoritet [Time and "Authority"], ROSSIISKAIA
GAZETA [Ros. Gaz.] Nov. 13, 2009, availableat http://www.rg.ru/2009/11/13/barsukov.html.
57. Ivan Novitskii, Tezisy doklada deputata Moskovskoi gorodskoi dumy [Theses of the report of
a Deputy of the Moscow City Duma] 7 (Nov. 16, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(presented at roundtable on raiding, Moscow Oblast Advocates Chamber).
58. Sabrina Tavernise, Handful of CorporateRaiders Transform Russia's Economy, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 2002, at Al; Daniel J. McCarthy & Sheila M. Puffer, Ilim Pulp Battles a Hostile Takeover, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN RUSSIA 300, 304 (Daniel J. McCarthy, Sheila M. Puffer & Stanislav V.
Shekshnia eds., 2004).
59. Tavernise, supra note 58, at Al; McCarthy & Puffer, supranote 58, at 304.
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Pulp's owners claimed that they were never notified of the suit, (though Deripaska
claimed that notice had been sent by mail.)60 The Deripaska companies then sent
in a private security force to seize the mill and court bailiffs arrived with an order
installing a new director. 61 However, the mill's owners refused to yield and filed
several countersuits against the Deripaska companies.62 Eventually, according to
Ilim, the case was settled amicably out of court.63
The same tactic was also allegedly used in a shareholder dispute within the
telecommunications company, VimpelCom, between shareholders Telenor, a
Norwegian telecommunications company, and Alfa Group, a Russian investment
group. In that case, Farimex, a tiny Virgin Islands company that owned less than
1% of VimpelCom filed suit against Telenor in a remote court in Siberia, a
location that had no discernible connection to the case. Nevertheless, the Siberian
court (at 2:00 a.m. on a Saturday) handed down a $1.7 billion damage award on
behalf of Farimex.64 This award was then used to freeze Telenor's assets in an
effort to compel it to pay $1.7 billion to Farimex. 65
Other tactics are also possible. For example, one lawyer told the author about
a situation in which a land raider offered the legitimate occupants the opportunity
to rent the land on extremely favorable terms. When they agreed, the rent
agreements were offered in court as evidence of their affirmation of his legal title
to the land.66
Stage Two - Takeover
During stage two, the documents obtained during Stage One are used as legal
cover for the forcible takeover of the target business. For example, in the Telenor
case discussed above, a lawyer for Farimex justified Alfa's attempts to force
Telenor to pay $1.7 billion by stating that "Everything is happening in strict
compliance with the law."67 Similarly, the court's judgment in the Kumarin case
identifies several instances in which the raiders used corrupt registration
documents during the forcible seizure of target businesses.68
A dramatic
illustration of this tactic is provided in the novel Raider by Pavel Astakhov, a well60. Tavernise, supra note 58, at Al.
61. Id.
62. Id.; McCarthy & Puffer, supranote 58, at 305.
63. Hugo Miller & Yury Humber, Determined Deripaska Casts a Long Shadow, THE ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 29, 2008, available at http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?story id=25836
&action id=2.
64. Dan Sabbagh, Telenor to Fight Siberian Court Order, The TIMES (London), Aug. 18, 2008,
available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industrysectors/telecoms/article4553417
.ece.
65. Nadia Popova, Court Marshals Order Sale of Telenor Stake in VimpelCom, THE ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, June 23, 2009, available at http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action-id=2&
storyid=29306.
66. Interview with Viadmir Lisnyak, Attorney, in Moscow, Russ. (Mar. 2009) (on file with
author).
67. Popova, supranote 65.
68. Kumarin Judgment, supra note 56, at 11.
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known Russian lawyer. In the novel, the head of the victim business is confronted
in his office by the raider's armed thugs, who tell him that he has lost his position
and must leave. The victim protests and calls the police. When the police arrive, a
judicial marshal working with the raiders presents a package of documents,
including minutes of a shareholders' meeting at which a new board of directors
was selected and a judicial order restraining 90% of the corporate shares. Satisfied
that the takeover is legally authorized, the police officers let the raiders continue
their business.69
Stage 3 - Laundering
During the "laundering" stage, the raider typically transfers the seized assets
through a series of shell companies to an ostensible "good faith purchaser,"
exploiting provisions of Russian law which make recovery of misappropriated
assets from a "good faith purchaser" almost impossible. 70 What this means, as a
practical matter, is that even if a raiding victim succeeds in obtaining a court ruling
voiding the transfer of his company's assets, he cannot recover the misappropriated
assets. As the Chief of the Investigative Committee of the General Procuracy,
Aleksander Bastrykhin, has written, "after a raiding takeover, the property is
laundered through a series of fictitious or offshore firms and eventually becomes
the property of a good faith purchaser. Demanding it from such an entity is
practically impossible." 71 Similarly, an August 2008 report by the National AntiCorruption Committee cites a typical case in which raiders falsified corporate
documents and transferred the seized assets through a series of offshore shell
companies to another offshore shell company which, relying on its alleged good
faith purchaser status, sent in its security forces to forcibly remove the real owners
from the property.72

69. PAVEL ASTAKHOV, REJDER [RAIDER] 25-26 (2008).
70. Article 167 of the Russian Civil Code provides that when a transaction is declared invalid,
each of the parties to the transaction must return to the other everything it has received in the deal or
make appropriate monetary compensation. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 167 (Russ.).
However, Russia's Constitutional Court held that these provisions "cannot be extended to a good faith
purchaser unless this is specifically provided by statute." WILLIAM BURNHAM, PETER B. MAGGS &
GENNADY M. DANILENKO, LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 356 (Juris
Publishing 3d ed. 2004). By contrast, U.S. law allows for recovery of assets from a third party in a civil
proceeding upon a showing that the purchaser "possesses knowledge of facts that suggest a transfer may
be fraudulent." See Banner v. Kassow, 104 F.3d 352, 352 (2d Cir. 1996). In addition, some states
recognize a "larceny exception" which defeats even a good faith purchaser's claim when it can be
shown that that the seller acquired title to the transferred property by larceny. Dimension Funding LLC
v. DKA Assocs., Inc., 191 P.3d 923, 926 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). For a complete discussion of the
aspects of Russian law that make recovery from a good faith purchaser difficult, see Firestone, supra
note 3.
71 Letter and recommendations from A.I. Bastrykhin, Chairman of the Investigative Comm. of
the Procuracy of the Russian Fed'n, to E.P. Velikhov, Chairman of the Counsel of the Public Chamber
of the Russian Fed'n para 2 (Oct, 30, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bastrykhin Letter].
72.
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This technique was also at the heart of the Kumarin case. According to the
court's judgment, Kumarin's organization recruited co-conspirators to pose as
"good-faith purchasers" and then arranged the sale of the seized businesses from
one to the other. Kumarin even retained lawyers to create litigation among the
good faith purchasers,74 a process which obscures the legal status of the
misappropriated assets, making their recovery, and any possible criminal
prosecution, more difficult. Bastrykhin considers abuse of the law on good faith
purchasers to be so severe that he recommends changing the traditional rule to
make it easier for raiding victims to get property back from even legitimate good
faith purchasers.
D. Collusive Litigation
Perhaps the most sophisticated form of legal abuse involves collusive
litigation, in which a party concocts uncontested litigation with the goal of
obtaining a judicial decision that can be used for criminal purposes. Collusive
litigation is sometimes used as a means to effectuate a raid (as, for example, in
Kumarin's orchestration of suits among the various "good faith purchasers"
through whom he laundered the raided business assets). But it can also be used in
support of other fraudulent schemes. For example, collusive litigation was
allegedly at the heart of a massive tax fraud in the infamous Hermitage Capital
case. According to Hermitage, raiders, operating in conjunction with law
enforcement officials, obtained a search warrant for the offices of certain
Hermitage law firms located in Moscow. During the search, the officials seized
corporate seals, charters and articles of association of Hermitage investment
companies, transferred ownership of the seized companies to co-conspirators, and

sued the misappropriated companies, using shell companies as the nominal
plaintiffs.76 According to court documents, lawyers representing the seized
companies conceded the claims entirely and the courts entered judgments against
the seized companies for hundreds of millions of dollars. Using these judgments,
the raiders claimed that the lawsuits had wiped out the historic profits of the seized
companies and obtained a refund of $230 million in "overpaid taxes" from the
government.

EFFECTIVENESS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF PROPERTY] 13-14 (MA Krasnov, KV

Kabanov, CB Vasya, EM Golenkovoy & GA Shantina, eds., 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author), [hereinafter NACC Report].
73. Kumarin Judgment, supra note 56, at 9, 13.
74. See, e.g., id at 7.
75. Bastrykhin Letter, supra note 71, at para. 2.
76. See Persecution of Hermitage Capital in Russia in Order to Steal US $230 Millionfrom the
Russian People, LAW AND ORDER IN RUSSIA, Oct. 7, 2009, http://lawandorderinrussia.org/news
releases/presentations/ [hereinafter Persecution ofHermitage].
77. Id. at 26, 56. See also Protokol Sudebnogo Zasedaniya [Protocol of Legal Proceeding], No
A5622479/2007 (Arbitrazhniy Sud Sankt-Peterburga i Leningradskoj Oblasti [Arbitration Court of St.
Petersburg and Leningrad Region] Aug. 28, 2007) (on file with author).
78. PersecutionofHermitage, supranote 76, at 50.
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According to Russian experts, collusive litigation is also used in complex
frauds that typically work as follows. The corporation perpetrating the fraud (the
"fraud corporation") enters into a contract, often with a foreign party (the "counterparty"). In order to protect itself against the vagaries of the Russian court system,
the counter-party inserts a clause requiring that disputes be adjudicated in an
international arbitral forum. The counter-party performs its obligations under the
contract. The fraud corporation does not. The counter-party avails itself of the
arbitration clause, files a claim, and wins an award. The fraud corporation then
arranges for a shareholder to bring a suit in a Russian court alleging that the
contract should be declared null and void because the representative who entered
into the contract on behalf of the fraud corporation lacked the requisite authority
under Russian law or had an interest in the transaction. The corporation does not
contest the charge in any meaningful way and the court finds that the contract was
entered into in violation of the corporation's internal rules and declares the entire
contract, including the arbitration clause, null and void. As a result, the arbitration
award cannot be enforced and the fraud corporation walks away with the benefits
of the contract, but no liability. 79
Perpetrators of such schemes often create the fraud corporation solely to enter
into the contract and deliberately create violations during negotiations with the
goal of using the violations to later invalidate the contract.so Schemes such as
these are made possible by several aspects of Russian corporate law, including: (1)
provisions that certain major transactions and transactions involving a possible
conflict of interest can be declared null and void if entered into without
shareholder approval or the approval of the Board of Directors, or in some cases,
shareholder approval;" (2) provisions allowing almost any shareholder, whether or
not the individual held stock at the time of the transaction, to challenge a corporate
transaction;8 2 (3) the absence of serious penalties for bad faith litigation;83 and (4)
79. B.R. KARABEL"NIKOV,
KOSVENNIYE ISKI KAK SPOSOB UZAKONIT NARUSHENIE
ROSSIISKIMI KOMPANIAMI IKH SOBSTVENNYKH OBIAAZATELSTV [Indirect Lawsuits by Russian
Companies as a Way to Legalize the Breach of Their Responsibilities] 1 (2007) (on file with author).
80. Conversation with P.A. Skoblikov, Professor, Acad. of Mgmt. of the Ministry of Interior
Affairs of Russ. (Dec. 29, 2009) (on file with author).
81. See, e.g., Federal'nyi Zakon ob Aktsionernykh Obshestvakh [FZAO] [Federal Law on Joint
Stock Companies] (2007), No. 120, art. 79(1) (requiring that a large scale transaction must be approved
by Board of Directors or General Shareholders Meeting as provided for herein); id. art. 79(3) (requiring
that a transaction involving more than 50% of the balance price of the corporation's shares must be
approved by 75% of voting shareholders at a general shareholders' meeting); id. art. 79(6) (indicating
that a major transaction concluded in violation of the Federal Law on Joint Stock Companies can be
declared null and void based on a suit by the corporation or a shareholder); Federalnyi Zakon ob
Obshestvakh s Ogranichenoi Otvetsvenostyu [Federal Law on Limited Liability Companies] [FZOOO]
(2007), No. 14-FZ, art. 45(3) (requiring that a transaction involving a conflict of interest must be
approved by a general shareholders' resolution); id art. 45(5) (requiring that a transaction involving
conflict of interest concluded in violation of art. 45 of the Law on Limited Liability Corporations can be
declared null and void based on a suit brought by the corporation or a shareholder); KARABEL"NIKOV,
supranote 79, at 1, 2.
82. FZAO, supra note 81, art. 79(6); FZOOO, supranote 81, art. 45(5); KARABEL"NIKOV, supra
note 79, at 2.
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Russian courts' reluctance to award quantum meruit damages in breach of contract
cases. 84
A collusive litigation scheme was apparently used in part of the litigation
discussed above between Telenor and Alpha. Telenor and Alpha jointly owned
Kyivstar, a Ukrainian telecommunications venture, pursuant to a contract that
provided for arbitration of any disputes before an arbitral tribunal in New York."
Eventually, Telenor fell into a dispute with the subsidiary through which Alpha
exercised its ownership of Kyivstar, an entity named Storm, and initiated
arbitration against Storm in New York.8 6 Storm then initiated a lawsuit in Ukraine
in which Alpren, a company which owned a minority share of Storm, sought a
declaration that the Storm-Telenor contract was invalid because Storm's General
Director had concluded it without the requisite shareholder approval.
According to a court in the Southern District of New York which was called
upon to consider the arbitrability of the Storm-Telenor dispute, the Ukrainian
litigation had a "number of curious features." For example, Storm did not retain
counsel or file any written opposition.8 9 Storm's legal representative in the case
was not a lawyer, but was the Vice President of the holding company that owned
both Storm and Alpren. 90 The proceeding lasted just ten minutes and, not
surprisingly, given the lack of any opposition, ended in a ruling that the
shareholders' agreement was invalid. 91 Moreover, when Storm appealed the
decision, it failed to submit any real defense of its position.92 The appellate court
not only affirmed the lower court's decision against Storm, but broadened it by
finding specifically that the Arbitration Agreement was invalid, a ruling which
Storm used to contest the arbitrability of the dispute in New York.93

After

extensive litigation, the Southern District of New York rejected Storm's
arguments, finding that "Storm colluded in the bringing of this litigation against
itself," held the dispute arbitrable, and eventually upheld the arbitration panel's

83. E.g., Grazhdanskii Protsessual'nyi Kodeks RF [GPK] [Civil Procedural Code] art. 99 (Russ.)
(allowing courts to award damages to victims of bad faith litigation; however, such a provision is
useless in deterring collusive litigation given that the "victimized" party is by definition connected to
the offending party). See also Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 10 (Russ.) (stating
broadly that "abuse of rights" shall not be permitted, but the only remedy it provides is for the court to
refuse to protect the rights of the offending party, a remedy that would not have any effect in cases of
collusive litigation). The Criminal Code does not criminalize collusive litigation or abuse of process.
84. KARABEL"NIKOV, supra note 79, at 2.
85. Storm LLC v. Telenor Mobile Commc'ns, No. 06 Civ. 13157 (GEL), 2006 WL 3735657, at 1
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2006).
86. Id. at 1-2.
87. Id. at 2, 4.
88. Id. at 3.
89. Id. at 2.
90. Id. at 3.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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award of relief to Telenor. 94 Storm then returned to Ukraine and through more
collusive litigation obtained a ruling that compliance with the New York court's
decision would place it in violation of Ukrainian law. 5 In rejecting this argument,
the court stated:
The [Ukrainian] opinions appear to be nothing more than a sham, a
pseudo-legal excuse for Storm and the Altimo Entities to continue to
refuse to do what they have all along refused to do. It is outrageous,
though not surprising given their prior conduct in this matter, that Storm
and the Altimo Entities would construct such a sham. It is both
outrageous and surprising that their counsel-two esteemed New York
law firms-would represent that sham to the Court, unexamined, as a
bona fide basis for their clients' refusal to comply with the [arbitration
panel's] Final Award.96
A recent legislative amendment based on a 2008 ruling by the Russian
Constitutional Court in the "case of Surinov" may provide new opportunities for
collusive litigation scams. The defendant, Tatevos Surinov, was convicted of
embezzlement. 7 While the criminal case was proceeding, Surinov initiated
litigation in the commercial (arbitrazh) courts 98 and obtained rulings that he had
acquired the subject property legally. He then attempted to use these rulings to get
the criminal case dismissed. 99 The court hearing the criminal case refused to give
preclusive effect to the commercial court rulings. 00 Surinov then challenged his
conviction in the Constitutional Court on the grounds that the criminal court's
refusal to give deference to the rulings of the arbitrazh courts was unconstitutional.
The Constitutional Court agreed, holding that the presumption of innocence

requires courts of general jurisdiction to give deference to arbitrazh court rulings
favorable to a criminal defendant.o In fulfillment of the Surinov decision, in 2009
President Medvedev signed into law amendments to the Code of Criminal

94. Id. at 12.
95. Telenor, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 608 n.14.
96. Id. One of the New York law firms was Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP.
97. P.A. Skoblikov, Preiuditsiya Aktov Arbitrazhnykh Sudov v. Ugolovnom Protsesse: Novoe
Prochteniye [PrejudicialActs ofArbitral Courts in CriminalProcedure: The New Reading], 2 J. Russ.
L. 69, 75 (2008).
98. Russia has a tripartite court system consisting of: (1) arbitrazh or commercial courts which
have jurisdiction over disputes between legal entities and between the state and legal entities; (2) courts
of general jurisdiction, which are empowered to hear criminal cases as well as civil disputes between
individuals and legal entities; and (3) the Constitutional Court, which is authorized to hear challenges to
the constitutionality of certain statutes. BURNHAM ET. AL., supranote 70, at 50.
99. Skoblikov, supranote 97, at 75.
100. Id. at 77. Specifically, Surinov challenged the constitutionality of Article 90 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, which provides, in pertinent part, that a sentence imposed by a court of general
jurisdiction has preclusive effect in a subsequent criminal investigation. Article 90 is silent with regard
to the potentially preclusive effect of a ruling in a civil case, an omission generally understood to mean
that a ruling by a commercial court has no preclusive effect in a criminal case. UgolovnoProtsessual'nyi Kodeks RF [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 90 (Russ.).
101. Bastrykhin Letter, supra note 71, at 12 (on file with author).
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Procedure essentially making the factual findings of arbitrazh court decisions
binding on investigators and prosecutors. 102
'Like many of the other rules discussed in this article, the Surinov ruling and
the amendments to Article 90 on issue preclusion appear well-motivated.
However, in the hands of criminals, they could easily be abused. Some Russian
experts contend that organized crime groups will now use collusive litigation in the
arbitrazh courts to obtain desired rulings on property issues that will then be used
to defeat criminal prosecutions or, even worse, initiate criminal prosecutions for
malicious purposes. 103 For example, a fraudster accused of misappropriation of
property could concoct litigation in the arbitrazh courts to establish faux title to the
property in question and then use that ruling to obtain the dismissal of the criminal
prosecution. Alternatively, raiders could orchestrate litigation in the arbitrazh
courts to establish their title to someone else's property and then use the arbitrazh
court ruling to initiate a criminal prosecution of the real property owner as part of a
scheme to misappropriate the property.
III. CAUSES
Upon first glance, it may appear that widespread legal abuse in contemporary
Russia is simply the result of state and judicial corruption. While there is
undoubtedly truth to this, corruption does not appear to provide a complete
explanation for at least two reasons. First, many of the schemes described herein
do not require corruption. For example, in collusive litigation schemes, a judge
presented with an uncontested claim has little choice but to enter judgment for the
plaintiff.104 Similarly, trademark squatters do not need to corrupt state officials if
they identify trademarks that have lapsed. Patent squatters do not need to corrupt
state officials if they are adept enough at drafting applications for utility model
patents. And even raiding does not always require corruption. For example, while
some of the state officials who registered fraudulent documents in the Kumarin
case were bribed, others were simply deceived.1 05 Second, to the extent that legal

102. See DOMINIQUE TISSOT & ANASTASIA PROZOR, CMS RUSSIA, RUSSIA TAX OUTLOOK #9
DECEMBER 2009 - JANUARY 2010: MAJOR AMENDMENTS TO RUSSIAN TAX LEGISLATION COMING
INTO FORCE IN 2010, at 5 (2010) (discussing Federal Law "On Amendments to Part 1 of the Tax Code
of the Russian Federation and Certain Regulations of the Russian Federation" No. 383-FZ dated 29
December 2009); KPMG, RUSSIAN LEGISLATIVE NEWS: TAX 2 (Feb. 10, 2010),
http://www.kpmg.ru/russian/supl/publications/periodicals/RussiaLegislativeNews/2010/1 RLN 10.pdf
(discussing Federal Law "On Amendments to Part 1 of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation and
Certain Regulations of the Russian Federation" No. 383-FZ dated 29 December 2009).
103. See Skoblikov, supranote 97, at 80-81 (on file with author); Bastrykhin Letter, supranote 71,
at 12-15 (on file with author).
104. It should be noted that Article 70(4) of the Arbitrazh Procedure Code provides that a judge
should not accept a party's concession if there is a basis to believe that the concession was made with
the goal of concealing certain facts. Arbitrazhno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks RF [APK] [Code of
Arbitration Procedure] art. 70(4) (Russ.). However, if the litigation is collusive and neither party has an
interest in presenting the relevant facts, it is hard to know how the judge could identify a basis for
rejecting the concession.
105. Kumarin Judgment, supra note 56, at 8 (on file with author).
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abuse does rely on corruption, explaining it as the result of corruption is simply
circular. It does not explain the underlying cause of the corruption or why it takes
the particular form that it does. Therefore, an additional explanation must be
sought elsewhere.
This explanation can be found in the continuing legacy of certain aspects of
the Soviet legal system. While the Russian legal system has, of course changed
since Soviet times, the current legal system is still heavily influenced by its Soviet
predecessor (which was, in turn, heavily influenced by its imperial predecessor).
As President Medvedev has noted, fifteen years is not sufficient to overcome the
legacy of traditional Russian legal attitudes.106 According to the leading textbook
on the Russian legal system:
[T]he Soviet and imperial past have left their marks on Russia's legal
system. This legacy affects not only the content of legal institutions and
rules, but also underlying attitudes about the nature and significance of
law and the way it should be reformed and enforced .... The effects of
the traditional Soviet and imperial authoritarian administrative style are
felt at every level and branch of government. 107

For purposes of this article, three aspects of the Soviet legal system appear
particularly relevant to explaining the prevalence of legal abuse.
First, the Soviet legal system was based on the notion that law is an
instrument of political rule rather than a neutral system for the arbitration of
disputes. According to historian Peter Solomon, "most Bolshevik leaders adopted
an instrumental view of the law. Without enshrining the law as a value and always
stressing the subordinate status of the law, Lenin and his colleagues used the law
as a tool for implementing their policies."108 The leading early Soviet legal theorist
E. B. Pashukanis provided a theoretical rationale for this approach, writing: "In
bourgeois-capitalist society, the legal superstructure should have maximum
immobility-maximum stability-because it represents a firm framework of the
movement of the economic forces whose bearers are capitalist entrepreneurs ....
[L]aw occupies among us, on the contrary, a subordinate position with reference to
politics."l 09
This approach reached practitioners, such as Procurator General Andrei
Vyshinsky, who in 1935 wrote: "[t]here might be collisions and discrepancies
between the formal commands of laws and those of the proletarian revolution ....

106. Dmitri Medvedev: Pravovoi nigilizm poiavilsia ne vchera [Dmitri Medvedev: Legal Nihilism
Did Not Occur Yesterday], VSLUH.RU NEWS, Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.vsluh.ru/news/politics/
155483.html [hereinafter VSLUH.RU NEWS -Legal Nihilism].
107. BURNHAM ET. AL., supranote 70, at 6.
108. PETER H. SOLOMON, JR., SOVIET CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER STALIN 17 (1996).
109. BERMAN, supra note 2, at 42 (quoting E. B. Pashukanis, Director, Institute of Soviet
Construction and Law, Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Revolutsiia Prava [The Soviet State and the
Revolution of Law] (1930) translatedin HUGH W. BABB, SOVIET LEGAL PHIL. 237-80 (1951)).
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This collision must be solved only by the subordination of the formal commands of
the law to those of party policy."110
Use of the law for political repression found its fullest and most dramatic
expression in the "show trials" in which Stalin's political enemies were convicted
of crimes against the state." This public abuse of the legal system set an example
for ordinary citizens, some of whom apparently began to use criminal denunciation
to advance their personal interests. Historian Sheila Fitzpatrick maintains that one
offshoot of the Stalinist terror was the denunciation by ordinary citizens of their
neighbors and co-workers as a way of settling personal scores and advancing their
personal interests. 1 12 Fitzpatrick cites one typical case that bears eerie similarity to
contemporary raiding and commissioned prosecutions. Two con men joined a
collective farm (kolkhoz), persuaded the kolkhoz members to criticize the
chairman for abuse of power, then used these criticisms to write denunciations
accusing him of corruption, all in order to get him replaced by their own man and
obtain control of the kolkhoz assets for themselves.113 Although the post-Stalin era
saw significant reforms, according to Solomon, "[t]he Stalinist mold of criminal
justice proved to have lasting significance, for it persisted for decades after the
death of the tyrant . . . each of [the] core features of Stalinist criminal justice
remained alive in the 1980s .... "114 For example, the use of criminal prosecution
to repress political dissent continued into the Brezhnev era. 15
Given this history, it is not surprising that the post-Soviet period still
maintains some features of what President Medvedev has termed "legal nihilism"
(defined as disrespect for the law), a problem which he identified as a legacy of
Russia's past.

16

It is also not surprising that many continue to view the law as an

110. Id.at42-43.
111. THE GREAT PURGE TRIAL, at ix-x (Robert C. Tucker & Stephen F. Cohen eds., 1965).
112. See SHEILA FITZPATRICK, EVERYDAY STALINISM: ORDINARY LIFE IN EXTRAORDINARY
TIMES: SOVIET RUSSIA IN THE 1930s 205-08 (1999); Nellie H. Ohr, The Care and Feeding of Homo
Sovieticus, H-RussIA, Mar. 2000, at 2 (reviewing SHEILA FITZPATRICK, EVERYDAY STALINISM:
ORDINARY LIFE IN EXTRAORDINARY TIMES: SOVIET RUSSIA IN THE 1930s (1999)). See also Vladimir

A. Kozlov, Denunciationand Its Functions in Soviet Governance:A Study of Denunciations and Their
Bureaucratic Handling From Soviet Police Archives, 1944-1953, in ACCUSATORY PRACTICES:
DENUNCIATION IN MODERN EUROPEAN HISTORY, 1789-1989, at 121, 133 (Sheila Fitzpatrick & Robert
Gellately eds., 1997) (identifying "interested denunciations" directed against supervisors, co-workers
and neighbors as one of the main forms of Stalin-era denunciation).

113. Sheila Fitzpatrick, Signals from Below: Soviet Letters of Denunciation of the 1930s, in
ACCUSATORY PRACTICES: DENUNCIATION IN MODERN EUROPEAN HISTORY, 1789-1989, at 85, 107-08

(Sheila Fitzpatrick & Robert Gellately eds., 1997).
114. SOLOMON, supranote 108, at 453.
115. See, e.g., ON TRIAL: THE SOVIET STATE VERSUS "ABRAM TERTZ" AND "NIKOLAI ARZHAK"

(Leopold Labedz & Max Hayward eds., 1967) (discussing a case that occurred in 1966, during the
Brezhnev Era 1964-1982).
116. VSLUH.RUNEWS -Legal Nihilism, supranote 106; Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko also note
that "legal nihilism in the mass consciousness ...

continues to undermine efforts to install legality as a

principle on which both society and the state should be based" and the Council of Europe has also
identified the development of a "legal culture" of respect for the law as one of Russia's main tasks.
BURNHAM ET AL., supranote 70, at 6-7.
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instrument for achieving extra-legal ends. During the Soviet period, abuse of the
law usually took the form of government use of the legal system for political ends.
Today, with the disappearance of Soviet ideology, it appears to have devolved all
too often into an instrument of extortion and fraud by criminals. But the
underlying principle of utilitarian manipulation of the law for improper ends
remains the same.
The second cause appears rooted in the Soviet legal system's relationship to
private property. The Soviet legal system criminalized entrepreneurial activity,
provided almost no protection for private property, and even provided a legal
mechanism for the expropriation of property. As Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko
write:
According to Marx, the abolition of private ownership of [the] means of
production was an absolute prerequisite for a just society. Guided by
this theory, the Soviet communists nationalized all means of production
and almost all private property .... As private property disappeared and
a command economy replaced private industry and commerce, most of
the private civil and commercial law disappeared. 117
The legacy of this system lives on in laws like the criminal prohibition on
"illegal entrepreneurship" that underlies many commissioned prosecutions, the
uncertain protection of intellectual property rights underlying patent racketeering
and trademark squatting, and the attitude among some law enforcement officials
that the "terrorization" of business is acceptable. It also lives on in the split
between general jurisdiction courts and arbitrazh courts (successors to the Soviet
state arbitrazh system which settled disputes between state enterprises), 18 which
make possible the issue preclusion schemes discussed above. Moreover, because
of the absence of a well-defined body of law regulating property rights, the postSoviet privatization of state assets was carried out without a firm legal framework.
As a result, property rights in contemporary Russia are uncertain, making it
possible to present a legal challenge to almost any property ownership, thus
creating fertile ground for all the schemes discussed above. 119 This point is well
illustrated by a recent survey in which 45 percent of Russian business owners said
that Russian property law provides no protection against illegal takings by the state
and 24 percent said that it actually facilitates the misappropriation of private
property by the state. 120

117. BURNHAM ET AL., supranote 70, at 4-5.
118. Id. at 77.
119. SKOBLIKOV, supra note 7, at 35 (noting that pursuit of certain business activities in postSoviet Russia almost inevitably involves violations of the law).
120. BUSINESS SOLIDARNOST': ORGANIZACIYA ZASCHITI PREDPRIYATIY [ORGANIZATION FOR
PROTECTION OF ENTERPRISES], ISSLEDOVANIYA BIZNESS ZHURNAL-ONLAIN [INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
BUSINESS
JOURNAL-ONLINE],
SCHITAETE LI
VY CHTO
ZAKONODATEL'NAYA
BAZA
I
PRAVOPRIMENITEL'NAYA PRAKTIKA POLNOST'YU ZASHISHYAYET VASH BIZNES OT POSYAGATEL'STV SO
STORONY GOSUDARSTVA? [DO YOU THINK THAT THE LAW AND ITS PRACTICE PROTECTS YOUR BUSINESS
FROM ILLEGAL TAKING BY GOVERNMENT?] (2009), http://www.kapitalisty.ru/research/podrobnee/003/.
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Third, the Soviet legal system was rigid, formalized and abstract, like
European civil law in the 19th Century, before the advent of legal realism. As
Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko write:
[T]he Soviet legal system missed out on developments that took place in
Western European civil law systems during the 20th [C]entury. One of
these was the relaxation in Western continental systems of many of the
more absolutist and dogmatic aspects of legal theory. In essence, many
aspects of Soviet legal theory remained stuck in a "time warp." To the
extent that it had a kinship with Western European civil law systems,
Soviet legal theory reflected 19th Century ideas that had long ago been
discarded by Western European legal scholars. 121
Such a pre-legal realism approach provides fertile opportunity for those who
seek to manipulate the letter of the law while violating the spirit of the law. For
example, formalism encourages judicial actions based on facially valid documents
without a meaningful inquiry into the process that generated the documents, thus
making the system vulnerable to raiding and collusive litigation. It promotes the
mechanistic enforcement of intellectual property rights that makes patent and
trademark squatting possible, as well as the literal application of rules on "good
faith purchasers" so often exploited by raiders. But perhaps most importantly, it
limits judges' ability to hold parties to a flexible notion of "good faith" and to
fashion practical, equitable remedies on a case by case basis, something that is
essential to preventing the kinds of schemes discussed herein.122 In short, as
Jeffrey Kahn has written:
Russia is not tabula rasa when it comes to law and legislation. Russia is
not starting from scratch, which certainly has advantages, but it has the
disadvantage of a lot of bad legal habits. Worst of these is a historical
attachment to bare legal positivism as a tool for state control. 123
IV. POSSIBLE CURES

Yet, not all is bleak. Consistent with President Medvedev's calls for an end to
the "terrorization" of business, the government appears to be taking important
initial steps to combat raiding and official extortion. Some of these measures are
designed to prevent raiding, others to facilitate its prosecution.
A. Prevention
In terms of prevention, on July 19, 2009, the Duma passed a series of
amendments to existing legislation, which was designed to limit the opportunities
121. BURNHAM ET AL., supranote 70, at 4.
122. See, e.g., Gevorg Beknazar-Yuzbashchev, Zloupotreblenie Pravom i Printsip Dobroi Sovesti v
Grazhdanskom Prave Rossii I Germanii [Abuse of the Law and the Principle of Good Conscience in
Russian and German Civil Law] 3, 24-5, (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Avtoreferat, Institut
Gosudarstva i Prava Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk [The Russian Science Academy Institute of
Government and Law]) (on file with author).
123. Jeffrey Kahn, Vladimir Putin and the Rule of Law in Russia, 36 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 511,
520 (2008).
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for raiding. 124 For example, in order to prevent schemes in which a raider obtains a
judicial decision in a remote location freezing the target corporation's assets (as
allegedly happened in the Ilim Pulp and Telenor/Farimex cases discussed above),
the law requires that corporate disputes and motions for restraint of corporate
assets be brought in the district where the corporation is located. 125 In order to
prevent "sneak attacks," the law also requires commercial courts to post on their
web sites information about the filing of the case and its progress. 126 To deter raids
accomplished through falsification of the corporate register, the law amends the
Law on Joint Stock Companies to provide that the company and its registrar will
be subject to joint and several liability for shareholder losses resulting from
improper maintenance of the shareholder register. 127 Other provisions of the July
19 amendments will make collusive litigation schemes more difficult. For
example, one provision amends the law on limited liability companies to provide
judges the discretion to refuse to invalidate corporate transactions concluded in
violation of internal corporate rules if such violations were not "material" and did
not cause damages to the company or the party bringing the claim.128
In another significant act, in December 2009, President Medvedev signed
amendments to the Criminal Code which provide tax offenders the opportunity for
exoneration from criminal liability if they pay their tax in arrears within a
designated period of time and which eliminate pretrial detention in criminal tax
investigations, two steps which are expected to reduce extortionate tax
129
prosecutions.
In April 2010, the Duma passed legislation restricting the
possibility of pre-trial detention in cases involving white collar crimes, including
fraud and money laundering.130 This legislation will also make it much more
difficult to use criminal prosecution to extort businesses.
B. Prosecution
In terms of prosecution, the Kumarin case, which resulted in a fourteen-year
sentence for Kumarin and convictions for seven other members of his gang, was a
notable success in the battle against raiding. 131 To facilitate future raiding
124. See, e.g., Federal'nyi zakon ot 19 iyulya 2009 0 vnesenii izmenyenii v otdel'nye akti
Rossisskoi Federatsii [Federal Law of July 19, 2009 on Amending Some Legislative Acts of the
Russian Federation] 2009, N. 205-FZ [No. 205-FZ ] [hereinafter July 19, 2009 Law]. Arbitrazhnyi
Protessual'nyi Kodeks RF [APK] [Code of Arbitration Procedure] arts. 38(4.1), 99(3.1) (Russ.).
125. See July 19, 2009 Law, art. 10.
126. Arbitrazhnyi Protessual'nyi Kodeks RF [APK] [Code of Arbitration Procedure] art. art.
225.4(1) (Russ.).
127. July 19, 2009 Law, art. 3; FZAO, art. 44(4), in BERNARD S. BLACK, RENIER KRAAKMAN &
ANNA S. TARASSOVA, GUIDE TO THE RussIAN LAW ON JOINT STOCK COMPANIES app. III p. 36 (1998).
128. July 19, 2009 Law, art. 6; see FZOOO, art. 43.
129. TisSOT & PROZOR, supra note 102; see Yana Yakovleva, Medvedev's Battle Against Legal
Nihilism, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?storyid=30693
&action id=2 (discussing Federal Law "On Amendments to Part 1 of the Tax Code of the Russian
Federation and Certain Regulations of the Russian Federation" No. 383-FZ dated 29 December 2009).
130. Ugolovno-Protessualnyi Kodeks RF [UPK] art. 108 1.1
131. Kumarin Judgment, supra note 56, at 168-71 (on file with author); Barsukov (Kumarin)
Priznan Vynovnym po Delu o Reiderstve v Sankt Peterburge [Barsukov (Kumarin) Found Guilty of
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prosecutions, Investigative Committee Chief Bastrykhin recently put forward a
series of legislative proposals which include the following: (a) "introducing
criminal liability for corruptly obtaining and using unlawful rulings from civil
litigation" (this would facilitate the prosecution of collusive litigation schemes and
raids based on corruptly obtained arbitrazh court decisions); (b)changing the law to
give civil court decisions only a rebuttable presumption of preclusive effect in
criminal cases and creating a mechanism for prosecutors to appeal decisions of
arbitrazh courts (this would help address the Surinov problem); and (c) amending
the law on good faith purchasers to address the laundering aspects of raiding. 132
Moreover, in 2009 a new law on cooperating witnesses took effect. The law
provides, in pertinent part, that defendants who cooperate completely and honestly,
as certified by the prosecutor and judge, cannot be sentenced to more than one-half
of the otherwise applicable maximum sentence.133 While applicable to all multidefendant cases, this law could be especially valuable in raiding prosecutions. As
Bastrykhin notes, prosecuting crimes that use corrupt judicial rulings is difficult
because it requires proof that rulings which are facially valid were corruptly
obtained with criminal intent. 13 4 Testimony from insiders who were part of the
scheme is often the only way to obtain such evidence and the new cooperating
witness law will, for the first time, provide Russian prosecutors with a legal
mechanism to reward witnesses for such testimony.135
C. Expansion ofJury Trials
One solution that the government has not yet pursued may lie in the
expansion of jury trials, currently available only for a limited class of criminal
cases, to all criminal cases.13 6 There are at least two reasons for this. First, trial by
jury is a deterrent to commissioned prosecutions, a fact recognized even by
America's founders. As Alexander Hamilton explained in Federalist 83, trial by
jury provides security against corruption because it is much harder to corrupt a jury
than a single judge. "By increasing the obstacles to success," Hamilton wrote, this
"complicated agency" discourages "[a]rbitrary impeachments, arbitrary methods of

Corporate Raiding in St. Petersburg], POLIT.RUNovoSTI [POLIT.RU NEWS], Nov. 12, 2009, http://www.
polit.ru /news/2009/11/12/Kumarin.html.
132. Bastrykhin Letter, supra note 71, at 14 (on file with author).
133. Federal Law 383-FZ, December 29, 2009 "On the Introduction of Amendments in the First
Part of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation and Other Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation."
134. Bastrykhin Letter, supra note 71, at 1 (on file with author).
135. Russian prosecutors appear to appreciate the value of the law. In a recent survey conducted
by the author, 109 out of 131 respondents indicated they think that the new cooperating witness law is
an "essential" element in combating organized crime and stated that they intend to use the new law in
their work. Survey by Thomas Firestone, Survey of Russian Prosecutors (2009) (on file with author).
Moreover, the law is already being used. For example, according to statistics of the Sverdlovsk District
Court, within the first three months, thirteen applications for cooperation were approved just in the city
of Belgorod. Statistics of the Sverdlovsk District Court (Oct. 8, 2009) (on file with author).
136. Trial by jury is not available for illegal entrepreneurship, money laundering, fraud and
criminal patent infringement - some of the statutes that are most commonly abused for extortionate
purposes. Nor is it available for any civil cases.
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prosecuting pretended offenses, and arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary
convictions." 3 This theory seems to apply even more so in contemporary Russia.
While the acquittal rate in bench trials is less than 1%, the acquittal rate in Russian
jury trials is approximately 20%,138 making commissioned prosecutions much less
likely to succeed. Moreover, according to judges and former jurors, Russian juries
regularly reject cases that they perceive as fabricated, commissioned, or brought
for improper purposes. 139 For example, in 2007, feeling that they were all that had
protected a businessman from wrongful conviction in a commissioned prosecution,
a group of former jurors even formed an association to protect and expand trial by
jury in Russia and to lobby for legal reform. 140 As one former investigator bluntly
wrote on a Russian blog, "commissioned cases fall apart in jury trials." 141 Thus,
the expansion of jury trials to more criminal cases, especially white collar crimes,
would reduce the opportunity to use criminal prosecution for extortionate
purposes.
Second, trial by jury can be an effective means of instilling popular respect
for the law and curing so-called "legal nihilism." In Democracy in America,
Alexis de Tocqueville described jury service as an education in civic virtue and
said that trial by jury in the United States had helped to "promote the legalistic
attitude even down to the lowest of the social classes." 142 According to
Tocqueville, jury service:
[M]olds the human mind to its procedures and becomes bound up, as it
were, with the very conception of justice .... Juries ... help to instill in
the minds of all the citizens something of the mental habits of judges,
which are exactly those which best prepare a people to be free. They

spread respect for the courts' decisions and the concepts of right

throughout all classes ...

143

A recent study of almost one hundred former jurors conducted by the Russian
Academy of Sciences suggests that jury service has begun to have such an effect
on Russians. In oral interviews, former jurors repeatedly described developing a
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sense of responsibility for the fate of another person. Many indicated that, even
months after their jury service ended, they continued to feel stress over the verdict
and to wonder whether they had done the right thing. 144 In numerous interviews
that the author has conducted with former jurors, they repeatedly described the
experience as empowering and explained that it had instilled in them a new interest
and respect for the law. Thus, jury service, if available to a large enough portion
of the population, can help to create a culture in which abuse of the law is less
tolerated.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
What are the implications of this study?
First, at the most general level, this study reminds us of the continuing legacy
of the Soviet past, the obstacles it creates for reformers, and the opportunities it
creates for criminals.
Second, it has implications for the broader theoretical debate over whether
participation in legitimate spheres of social and economic activity is likely to force
criminals to "legitimize" their behavior. Daniel Bell in his famous essay "Crime as
an American Way of Life: A Queer Ladder of Social Mobility" predicted the
"embourgeoisement" of organized crime in America and its decline "[w]ith the
rationalization and absorption of some illicit activities into the structure of the
economy . . . ." 145 This theory has been applied to Russia by those who see
contemporary Russian financial crime as a stage in the development of Russian
capitalism, analogous to the robber baron era in U.S. history.146 However, this
study highlights the opposite possibility-when criminals enter the legal system,
they are just as likely to corrupt the legal system as the legal system is likely to
force them to behave honestly. Thus, this study suggests that we should not be
sanguine about contemporary Russian financial crime or assume that it is simply a
passing fad. Rather, affirmative measures on the part of governments and
businesses are necessary.
Third, governments and enforcement authorities, both in Russia and in
countries affected by the schemes discussed above, should recognize manipulation
of the legal system as a new and potentially dangerous form of crime.
Investigators should be prepared to investigate the legal aspects of such schemes
and to trace the origins ofjudicial decisions and other legal documents used therein
in the same way that they investigate financial machinations and the origins of
144. Interview by L.M. Karnozova and V.S. Merkulova with Russian Jurors (on file with author).
145. DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE EXHAUSTION OF POLITICAL IDEAS IN THE
FIFTIES 148-50 (Harvard Univ. Press 1988) (1960).
146. See e.g., Annelise Anderson, The Red Mafia: A Legacy of Communism, in ECONOMIC
TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA: REALITIES OF REFORM (Edward P. Lazear ed., 1995)
(summarizing arguments that contemporary Russian organized crime is an early stage of capitalism like
the robber baron era); see also DAVID E. HOFFMAN, THE OLIGARCHS: WEALTH AND POWER IN THE
NEW RUSSIA 6 (2003) (comparing techniques of the first Russian financiers to exploitation of banks,
the state, and investors, manipulation of the stock market and acquisition of companies by early 20h
Century American businessmen).
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suspected criminal schemes. Governments should review their relevant legislation
and, where appropriate, consider heightening civil and/or criminal penalties for bad
faith litigation, falsification of documents and abuse of process.
Fourth, this study has implications for the provision of rule of law technical
assistance to developing countries. Specifically, it highlights the danger that law
enforcement tools that have proven effective in combating organized crime in the
West, such as criminal penalties for money laundering, can become perverted
when transported to foreign soil and can sometimes enhance, rather than reduce,
organized crime if they are not carefully adapted to local conditions and
accompanied by appropriate guarantees of transparency.
Thus, technical
assistance providers should carefully study local conditions and, rather than
automatically basing legislative recommendations on what has worked in the
United States, 147 should support efforts to adopt legislation addressing receiving
countries' specific crime problems. In the case of Russia, legislation establishing
criminal liability for such practices as commissioned prosecutions, trademark
squatting, and collusive litigation, as well as legislation removing criminal liability
for patent infringement, could prove as important in combating organized crime as
the adoption of legislation based on U.S. experience.
Finally, while good legal counsel is essential in any business in any country,
the prevalence of legal abuse in Russia means that it is especially important for
businesses operating there. Quality legal counsel can ensure that contracts are
drafted tightly, with minimal opportunity for abuse; that corporate books and
records are subject to minimum risk of falsification; and that patents and
trademarks are maintained and are not vulnerable to squatting. Although such
measures are not a guarantee of protection, they can help to reduce the risks.
Complete protection will be possible only after more significant changes in the law
and the societal mindset.

147. A previous article by the author provides a good example of this mistake. See Thomas
Firestone, What Russia Must Do to Fight OrganizedCrime, 14 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA: J. POST-SOVIET
DEMOCRATIZATION 59 (2006).

